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NO. 55 NOVEMBER 2020 Introduction 
Bolivia after the 2020 General Elections 
Despite the Return to Power of the MAS, a New Political Era Could Be About to Begin 
Claudia Zilla and Madeleyne Aguilar Andrade 
On 8 November Luis Arce and David Choquehuanca took office as the new president 
and vice-president of Bolivia, respectively. Less than a month earlier, they had won 
the elections in the first round with more than 55 per cent of the vote. Thus, the Move-
ment towards Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo or MAS) was returned to power and 
obtained an absolute majority in the parliament after a one-year interregnum follow-
ing the fraudulent ballot in 2019. This outcome can be attributed not only to the desire 
of the people for economic and political stability as well as social peace but also to 
the poor performance of the transitional government of Jeanine Áñez and the oppo-
sition’s fragmentation and polarizing campaign. The dethronement of Evo Morales and 
the current adverse conditions – not least Covid-19 – are among those factors that 
will make it impossible for the MAS to conduct business as usual. 
 
It was a long and extremely difficult path to 
the October 2020 general elections, which 
were a re-run of the annulled October 2019 
ballot. Evo Morales had pushed through 
four presidential mandates in a row by 
means of violating constitutional provisions 
(2009), ignoring the results of a plebiscite 
against his re-election (2016) and obtaining 
both the Constitutional Court’s recognition 
of re-election as a human right (2017) and 
the Supreme Electoral Court’s authorization 
of his repeated candidacy (2018). In last year’s 
general elections, serious accusations – 
both in Bolivia and elsewhere – of elec-
toral fraud were made after Morales’s lead 
had grown significantly following an inter-
ruption in the speed-count. By 25 October 
2019, when the Supreme Electoral Court 
officially declared Morales’s victory in 
the first round of the elections, Bolivians 
for and against him had already taken to 
the streets. In its final report, published 
in December, as well as in its preliminary 
reports of October and November, the elec-
toral observation mission of the Organiza-
tion of American States (OAS) testified to 
significant irregularities in the counting of 
the votes. On 10 November, as the protests 
continued unabated and became more vio-
lent, Morales had initially announced both 
the replacement of electoral officials and 
the holding of repeat elections, only to 
resign a couple of hours later. That step had 
been suggested – separately and in front of 
the cameras – by both the commander-in-
chief of the armed forces and the chief of 
police (see SWP-Aktuell 69/2019). Moreover, 
members of the police force had joined in 
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the mutiny against the government and left 
sensitive public buildings unprotected. 
Transition as Prelude to a 
New Order 
Jeanine Áñez, Senator for the conservative 
Social-Democratic Movement and second 
vice-president of the upper chamber, 
assumed the interim presidency of Bolivia 
on 12 November 2019. She was the highest 
political authority to remain in office after 
the president and vice-president of the coun-
try, the presidents of both the upper and 
lower chambers, and the first vice-president 
of the Senate had all resigned. For this 
reason, Áñez assumed first the presidency 
of the Senate and then the interim presi-
dency of the state, which was possible only 
at a joint session of the two chambers of the 
Plurinational Legislative Assembly attended 
exclusively by parties in opposition to MAS. 
A first attempt to hold a session in the 
Senate had failed owing to the absence of 
MAS members, who held a majority of two-
thirds and had prevented a quorum. 
On the night of her inauguration, Áñez 
entered the presidential palace holding up 
a huge book in front of the cameras and 
exclaiming “God has allowed the Bible to 
re-enter the Palace. May He bless us!” This 
pseudo-religious scene contrasted with 
Morales’s policy of the secularization of the 
Bolivian state. Áñez’s restorative emphasis 
anticipated the approach of her one-year 
transitional government, which showed 
signs of seeking revenge against the MAS 
and its supporters, saw itself as the pre-
cursor of “post-MASism” and cultivated 
ambitions of pushing through long-term 
policies. From the very beginning, officials 
embarked on a campaign of defaming and 
stigmatizing the previous government, 
which was persistently labelled as narco-
terrorist. Several members of the new cabi-
net, first and foremost Government Minis-
ter Arturo Murillo, even promised that 
(violent) enemies would be “hunted down”. 
Considering himself to be in danger, Mora-
les first went into hiding in Bolivia, then flew 
to Mexico to seek political asylum and finally 
settled in Buenos Aires, along with his vice-
president, Álvaro García Linera. Argentina is 
the country that has the largest Bolivian dias-
pora, including numerous MAS supporters. 
From there, Morales coordinated political 
activities and gave press conferences until 
his return to Bolivia on 9 November 2020. 
The composition of Áñez’s first cabinet 
did not serve to integrate and pacify a coun-
try in turmoil but rather signalled an anti-
MAS approach at the political, social, re-
gional and ethnical levels: that is, its mem-
bers came from the opposition, the upper 
classes and mainly eastern Bolivia and were 
predominantly white. Two politicians who 
had run for the presidency in the 2019 elec-
tions were also included in the interim 
president’s cabinet. All in all, she made 
around 15 ministerial changes in her one 
year in office; high-ranking (political) 
appointments continued to take place just 
one week before Luis Arce’s inauguration. 
In a similar way behaved Karen Longaric, 
a lawyer and expert in international law 
from Sucre, who was appointed minister of 
foreign affairs and had already held various 
positions at the Foreign Ministry. She was 
soon making public announcements and 
decisions that revealed her intention to over-
haul Bolivian foreign policy in terms of 
both content and personnel: around 80 per 
cent of ambassadors were replaced and 
diplomatic relations with the United States 
restored following an 11-year interruption. 
The ‘Adaptability’ of the 
Institutions of Law and Order 
Remarkably quickly, the (old) judiciary 
and security apparatus adapted to the new 
narratives and policies of the civilian tran-
sitional government. In breach of consti-
tutional provisions, it was the head of the 
armed forces, Williams Kaliman, who 
placed the presidential sash on Áñez at her 
inauguration ceremony. The following day, 
Áñez replaced the military leadership. 
The police and military operations under-
taken to restore public order were by no 
 SWP Comment 55 
 November 2020 
 3 
means free of excessive use of force. On 
16 November the transitional government 
passed Supreme Decree No. 4078 to exempt 
the armed forces from any criminal liability 
for the consequences of their actions. The 
interim president denied that any repres-
sive abuses had been committed against 
civilians by the law enforcement agencies. 
While the Bolivian Prosecutor-General’s 
Office supported her claim, the Inter-Ameri-
can Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) 
documented several fatal incidents in which 
the state security forces had been involved. 
In a report released on 10 December fol-
lowing an IACHR observation team’s visit to 
Bolivia, the commission noted the deaths 
recorded on 11 November in the Pedregal 
neighbourhood of the South Zone of the 
municipality of La Paz, the massacre of 
Sacaba, Cochabamba on 15 November and 
the massacre of Senkata, El Alto on 19 No-
vember. These repressive actions targeted 
MAS protestors and local residents and 
took place under the implementation of 
the immunity decree. The interim president 
eventually repealed that decree on 27 No-
vember, arguing that it was no longer nec-
essary as social peace had been restored. 
For its part, the IACHR not only condemned 
racist acts against the indigenous people 
but also criticized plans of the parliament 
(in which the MAS had a majority) to grant 
amnesty to former President Morales and 
former Vice-President García Linera. Thus, 
the transitional government squandered 
the opportunity to establish judicial inde-
pendence. Instead, it put pressure on prose-
cutors and judges to conduct criminal in-
vestigations against more than 100 people, 
including Morales himself and others linked 
to his government, for sedition and/or ter-
rorism. 
The Corruption of ‘Others’ 
As the government was confronted with the 
challenge of stabilizing the country and of 
organizing new elections at the same time, 
it soon had to deal with yet another daunt-
ing task – gaining control over the spread 
of the coronavirus. On 10 March 2020, Bo-
livia reported its first two confirmed cases 
of infection. A state of national sanitary 
emergency was declared under Supreme 
Decree No. 4196 on 17 March. Four days 
later, lockdown was imposed throughout 
Bolivia (Supreme Decree No. 4199). There-
after, Interim President Áñez introduced 
successive complementary measures aimed 
at pandemic containment. 
As early as May 2020, the transitional 
government, which had vocally decried the 
Morales administration for corruption and 
clientelism, found itself involved in a scan-
dal over the alleged purchase of 170 respi-
rators from Spain at inflated prices. The 
incident led to the resignation of the Boliv-
ian minister of health. Moreover, the equip-
ment turned out to be unfit for its intended 
purpose as it was not suitable for use in in-
tensive care units. Further corruption cases 
(some 24 in total) engulfed the interim 
presidency, including those related to the 
state-owned telecommunications (Entel), 
oil (YPFB), electricity (ENDE) and aeronautic 
(DGAC) companies. 
Voting Once Again 
On 24 November 2019, Áñez signed Law 
No. 1266 on the “Extraordinary and Tran-
sitional Regime for Holding General Elec-
tions”, which the MAS-controlled parlia-
ment had passed. Among other things, the 
law provided for the appointment of new 
judges at of the Supreme Electoral Court, 
the annulment of the 2019 general elec-
tions and the holding of repeat elections 
in 2020. At the same time, it banned those 
who had held elected office at the national 
level during the previous two electoral 
periods from running for the same office 
in this year’s elections. This provision pre-
vented Morales and his vice-president from 
running as candidates for the national ex-
ecutive once again. Yet, the MAS nominated 
Morales as its candidate for Senator for the 
Department of Cochabamba, but the Su-
preme Electoral Court ruled that he did not 
meet the constitutional requirement of hav-
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ing had permanent residence in the district 
for at least two years (Article 149). In this 
way, Morales was kept out of the running. 
As regards the coronavirus crisis, the 
elections were postponed several times. 
Social, rural and unionist groups linked to 
MAS responded to those delays by mobiliz-
ing and forming roadblocks to demand an 
early vote. In the end, Áñez, the parliament 
and the Supreme Electoral Court agreed to 
schedule the elections for 18 October. 
On 24 January, despite having promised 
not to participate in the new elections, Áñez 
announced her own presidential candidacy. 
This decision drew considerable criticism, 
even from within the ranks of her own ad-
ministration, whose cohesion was threat-
ened. On 17 September, after a national 
survey on voting intentions had revealed 
that she could expect less than 8 per cent 
support, Áñez withdrew her candidacy. 
Initially, there were eight presidential 
candidates (six male and two female), high-
lighting a large degree of fragmentation 
among the opposition forces to the MAS. 
After a couple of the candidates had dropped 
out, the anti-MAS vote was split mainly be-
tween two strong candidates: Carlos Mesa of 
the centre-leftist alliance “Citizens’ Commu-
nity” (Comunidad Ciudadana) and Luis Fernan-
do Camacho of the rightist coalition “We 
Believe” (Creemos). However, even if they had 
united around a single candidate, the oppo-
sition forces would still not have won against 
Luis Arce, the presidential candidate of the 
MAS, who was able to claim an easy victory 
in the first round with 55.11 per cent of the 
vote (Mesa received 28.83 per cent and Cama-
cho just 14 per cent). Turnout was a record 
88.42 per cent (under compulsory voting for 
an electorate of about 7.5 million people); 
and the election observation missions of both 
the OAS and European Union confirmed the 
integrity and transparency of the elections. 
All candidates immediately accepted 
the election results, as did Interim President 
Áñez – with the exception of Camacho. 
The Bolivian Episcopal Conference and 
some members of the transitional govern-
ment backed his critical stance and recom-
mended an (international) audit of the elec-
tion results. In Santa Cruz, Camacho’s home 
region and the entrepreneurial and agri-
cultural centre of Bolivia, the “We Believe” 
coalition and the civil activist group Comité 
pro Santa Cruz have been organizing protests 
to contest the election results. Camacho, 
a right-wing populist and the defender of 
Catholic-conservative values, heads both 
of these groups, which are seeking greater 
autonomy for the region. In the demonstra-
tions against Morales in 2019, Camacho 
played an important role; and, as the leader 
of radical regionalism, he will pose a chal-
lenge both for Arce’s presidency and 
Bolivia’s governability. 
The Triumph of the MAS 
The MAS has re-emerged as the main po-
litical force in Bolivia. It won in six of the 
country’s nine departments as well as in 
the diaspora (4.7 per cent of voters live out-
side Bolivia), thereby securing control of the 
national executive and an absolute majority 
in both chambers of the parliament. Poor 
pandemic management, several corruption 
cases and repeated derogatory statements 
about the indigenous and rural populations 
had undermined the legitimacy of the tran-
sitional government. At the same time, its 
poor performance diminished the appeal 
of any project of the opposition since most 
of the opposition forces pursued a common 
strategy of being against the MAS. 
While the presidential candidate Mesa 
received a majority of votes in the depart-
ments of Beni and Tarija as well as in most 
cities, especially among those citizens who 
have a higher education and are better off, 
the MAS was able to count on the support 
of its core voters – namely, the indigenous 
rural population, the poor urban popula-
tion and informal workers in the suburbs. 
Moreover, it seems that it was able to win 
back the support of those who had distanced 
themselves from the movement not because 
of its policies but because of the personalist 
and hegemonic leadership of Morales. 
Camacho, for his part, focused his cam-
paign exclusively on the interests of the 
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lowlands in the east of the country, thereby 
fostering a regional-identitarian divide. So, 
while he won in the Department of Santa 
Cruz and obtained 51.5 per cent of the vote 
in its capital city, he received less than 1 
per cent in La Paz. During their election 
campaigns amid the Covid-induced eco-
nomic crisis and the ongoing political and 
social polarization in the country, both 
Mesa and Camacho concentrated on trying 
to prevent the MAS from returning to power 
and thereby missed the opportunity to 
explain to voters how they would seek to 
resolve the problems of the people. 
By contrast, the MAS presidential and 
vice-presidential candidates had a positive 
agenda: they argued that the only common 
enemies were the coronavirus, hunger and 
income insecurity. Arce summarized his 
government programme as comprising five 
short-term measures targeting the people 
most affected by the coronavirus crisis: 
∎ The distribution of food baskets by the 
armed forces for people in need 
∎ Prohibition on the dismissal of wage 
earners in both the public and private 
sectors, including female domestic 
workers forced to stay at home 
∎ For the duration of the quarantine, 
payment by the state of the rents of 
those with no fixed income 
∎ The formation of solidarity brigades 
tasked with supporting the elderly and 
disabled through food and medical 
deliveries and at-home payment services 
∎ In coordination with municipal govern-
ments, the provision of shelters with can-
teens and medical staff for the homeless. 
Moreover, presidential candidate Arce 
and vice-presidential candidate Choque-
huanca were able to personify the renewed 
hopes of the economically and ethnically 
disadvantaged. For his part, Arce has over-
seen Bolivia’s economic policies and suc-
cesses as minister of economy and public 
finance since 2006 (with an interruption 
in 2017–18 owing to treatment for renal 
cancer). He is considered a pragmatic and 
level-headed politician who represents the 
urban left. Choquehuanca, an indigenous 
Aymara, was Morales’s foreign minister 
from 2006 to 2017 (that is, for most of the 
time that the latter served as president). He 
has long been seen as the third most-impor-
tant leader of the MAS, after Morales and 
García Linera. He is known as an indig-
enous and rural activist but is also an intel-
lectual who has theorized on Buen Vivir 
(Good Living), a key concept that underpins 
the indigenous people’s worldview of ad-
equate or harmonious coexistence. 
It was, in fact, Morales who pushed 
through the Arce-Choquehuanca candida-
cies with the aim of targeting a wider spec-
trum of voters. Several grassroots organi-
zations of the MAS had originally chosen 
Choquhuanca as the presidential candidate 
and Andrónico Rodríguez as his running 
mate. The latter, who is a young union 
leader of coca growers in Cochabamba and 
a rising star within MAS, will now be the 
head of the new Senate. 
Before the repeat elections, Arce acknowl-
edged that members of the MAS had failed to 
strengthen the party. He promised that they 
would not allow Morales to participate in 
the new government and that they – unlike 
him – would not cling to power. However, 
in the wake of the MAS’s electoral victory, 
there was already evidence of attempts to 
preserve the political hegemony of the MAS. 
Ensuring Parliamentary Leverage 
Owing to the peculiar electoral system in 
the context of Bolivian presidentialism, the 
party of the winner of the presidential elec-
tion generally secures a parliamentary 
majority, especially if the candidate suc-
ceeds in the first round. Around half of the 
deputies in the parliament are elected in 
single-member districts by voters casting 
one of their two votes, while the remaining 
deputies run in multi-member constituen-
cies and, together with the candidates for 
the presidency, the vice-presidency and the 
Senate, are elected on a single closed party 
list by voters casting their other vote. There-
fore, in the latter case, a splitting of the 
vote between the executive and legislative 
branches is not possible. 
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While Morales secured around 61 per 
cent of the vote and thereby was able to 
secure a two-thirds majority in both cham-
bers of the parliament in the 2014 elec-
tions, Arce will have only an absolute 
majority. The MAS-dominated upper and 
lower chambers responded to this situation 
by amending parliamentary regulations on 
27–28 October – just over a week after 
the repeat elections and a couple of days 
before the end of the parliamentary session 
(on 29 October). They lowered the threshold 
requirement in both chambers for passing 
various decisions from a qualified to an 
absolute majority, a last parliamentary act 
that drew severe criticism from NGOs such 
as the Latin-American Network for Parlia-
mentary Transparency and brought some 
Bolivians out onto the streets. 
At its last session, which was held jointly 
by the upper and lower chambers, the out-
going parliament approved the final report 
on those who had died during the confron-
tations between the security forces and 
MAS supporters in Senkata (El Alto) and 
Sacaba (Cochabamba) in October 2019. 
Based on this document, which is to be sub-
mitted to the offices of public prosecutor, 
the attorney-general and the comptroller-
general, the parliament adopted a recom-
mendation for the incoming parliament to 
file a liability suit against Interim President 
Áñez and to push for criminal prosecutions 
against 11 ministers of her cabinet. 
Against the backdrop of this legacy, there 
is a positive feature of the new Bolivian 
parliament that deserves to be highlighted. 
Thanks to the stricter implementation of 
gender parity provisions, the share of women 
in the parliament has now risen to 51.9 per 
cent. But outside the parliament, massive 
gender inequality continues to prevail. For 
example, Bolivia has one of the highest 
femicide rates in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (2.3/100,000 inhabitants) while 
its abortion regulations and case law are 
very restrictive. Moreover, the presence of 
women in politics (descriptive representa-
tion) still has to translate into pro-women 
legislation and policies (substantive repre-
sentation) as well as a culture of respect. 
The Start of the New Government 
After more than 14 years in power followed 
by a one-year interregnum, a new MAS gov-
ernment was inaugurated on 8 November 
2020. Although Arce has engaged in some 
self-criticism and called for unity in the coun-
try, he insists – as do most MAS politicians 
– that the party won last year’s elections 
fair and square. He characterizes the events 
that followed the vote as a coup d’état sup-
ported by the OAS and calls the transitional 
government of Áñez a dictatorship. 
The mainly socioeconomic government 
programme of the newly elected president 
comprises several elements to be tackled in 
a staggered manner. The short-term meas-
ures are a draft law on a new tax on large 
personal wealth, industrialization through 
import substitution, achieving security 
through food sovereignty and promoting 
domestic tourism. The medium- and long-
term measures are the production of renew-
able ecological diesel to replace fuel imports, 
the industrialization of Bolivian lithium (in 
which Germany is involved), and the Mutún 
project (with Chinese participation), an iron 
mine through which the country is aiming 
to launch a steel industry. For this reason, the 
agenda of the new government focuses not 
only on the reactivation of public investment 
but also on the participation of international 
partners, while ensuring that the Bolivian 
state retains a share of more than 50 per cent. 
For their part, the grassroot organiza-
tions attached to the MAS have demanded 
direct, substantive participation in govern-
ment. Within the broad and heterogeneous 
movement, access to public positions has 
always acted as centripetal force. For the 
new president, meeting the demands of 
these organizations by creating numerous 
ministries pose a challenge in times of crisis, 
when austerity is called for. One day after 
his inauguration, Arce appointed 16 minis-
ters – only three of them female. Morales 
is not a member of the new cabinet, as he 
and Arce had earlier agreed. Instead, the 
former president has let it be known that 
he intends to settle in Cochabamba and 
work with the social organizations. 
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Because of a judiciary guided by power 
politics and that for the past year had been 
pursuing leaders of the MAS rather than its 
rivals, Morales currently faces several dif-
ferent criminal charges: electoral fraud 
in 2019, sedition and terrorism (over the 
blocking of roads), two cases of statutory 
rape (because of a relationship with an 
underage female) and, in a lawsuit filed 
with the International Criminal Court in 
The Hague, crimes against humanity. 
According to Morales himself, there are 
about 30 trials against him. On 26 October 
the arrest warrant issued against him was 
lifted, as a result of which returning to 
Bolivia no longer meant he could end up 
in prison. One day later, arrest warrants 
against former ministers in the Morales 
administration were lifted, too. Today, Arce 
acknowledges that it was a mistake of the 
MAS government to have introduced the 
popular election of judges and recommends 
returning to some kind of meritocratic sys-
tem – but not to party quotas. 
Despite its experience in government, a 
new era in the rule of the MAS could now 
be about to begin owing to the changed 
conditions within the country. The political 
party of Evo Morales was able to win the 
elections without the former president, its 
founder and personalist leader, at the top 
of the electoral list. And it is Arce – who is 
not a union leader of coca growers but an 
economist and technocrat – who will gov-
ern not during a commodity boom but 
during the Covid-19 pandemic. 
Coronavirus Crisis in a 
Poor Country 
The Covid-19 pandemic reached Bolivia at 
a time when the country was wracked by 
political and social fragility under the tran-
sitional government. At the same time, the 
growth of its small economy (GDP per capita 
of just US$3,320), which relies heavily on 
the extraction of natural resources, had been 
slowing since 2015, mainly owing to the 
fall in natural gas exports to Argentina and 
Brazil. After more than a decade of strong 
annual growth (about 5 per cent), which, 
combined with social policy, had led to a 
significant reduction in poverty, the GDP 
annual growth rate dropped to 2.2 per cent 
in 2019. Like many countries in the region, 
Bolivia had experienced the reprimariza-
tion of exports and a growing dependency 
on imports during the commodity boom 
(2004–13) – a dependency that continues 
to this day. 
Although the MAS government has tra-
ditionally been seen as prudent and rather 
orthodox with regard to macroeconomic 
management, the current state of the pub-
lic finances is critical. The fiscal deficit has 
been growing since 2014 and the general 
government deficit reached 6.9 per cent of 
GDP in 2019. Currently, state expenditures 
are rising rapidly owing to the economic 
aid measures introduced during the corona-
virus crisis in the form of income transfers 
to households and financial support for 
micro, small and medium-sized businesses. 
In July 2020, unemployment stood at 11.8 
per cent. Meanwhile, the International 
Monetary Fund estimates that GDP will 
decline around 8 per cent in 2020. 
Although Bolivia was one of the first 
countries in the region to respond to the 
pandemic by implementing containment 
measures, the Covid-19 incidence rate in 
August 2020 was 850.8 per 100,000 popu-
lation and the death rate 4 per cent. The 
precariousness of the country’s healthcare 
system, the qualitative deficit of housing 
and the difficulty for people living in 
poverty without savings to adhere to the 
strict lockdown and refrain from working 
have all contributed to the spread of the 
pandemic in Bolivia. 
In Bolivia, around 34 per cent of the 
population has – for various reasons – no 
health insurance, despite free and (nomi-
nally) universal healthcare provided by the 
state and several private health-insurance 
schemes. Public healthcare expenditure in 
Bolivia is the equivalent of 4.4 per cent of 
GDP (2017), which is just below the Latin 
American average (4.8 per cent) and far 
below the 6 per cent recommended by the 
World Health Organization. Moreover, 
SWP Comment 55 
November 2020 
8 
Bolivia’s annual healthcare expenditure per 
capita (US$332) is one of the lowest in the 
region. Even compared with other countries 
in Latin America, there is a low density of 
doctors, hospital beds and intensive care 
units in Bolivia, as well as deficits in medical 
supplies (data in this section are from the 
UNDP-Report of October 2020 and the IMF). 
Amid the ongoing pandemic, Arce will 
have to demonstrate that he is capable of 
dealing with a major crisis. It is unlikely 
that policies that worked in a past charac-
terized by windfall revenues will suffice 
under the changed national, regional and 
international conditions. 
Stumbling Into the Future 
With regard to what has happened in Bolivia 
since the 2019 general elections, it is largely 
one-sided narratives that prevail, reflecting 
the social and political polarization within 
the country. Moreover, events often seem 
to contradict looked through clear-cut con-
cepts, which hampers consensual under-
standing. According to a widely shared 
definition, a coup d’état takes place when 
a state actor removes a head of state or gov-
ernment illegally. Should the suggestion 
by the commander-in-chief of the Bolivian 
armed forces and the chief of police that 
Morales resign be regarded as his de facto 
removal? On the one hand, it is unlikely 
that Morales would have been able to con-
tinue to govern without the backing and 
loyalty of the state security forces; indeed, 
the head of the military placing the sash on 
the interim president at her inauguration 
sent a strong message about the political 
stance of the armed forces. On the other 
hand, the positioning of the military fol-
lowed the massive demonstrations against 
electoral fraud and the umbrella organiza-
tion of the Bolivian trade unions (COB), 
which is close to the MAS, demanding 
Morales’s resignation. In this situation, the 
head of the military, who had been long 
loyal to Morales, may have opted to change 
sides in a timely manner. At the same time, 
it is unusual for a parliament to continue 
working in the wake of a coup d’état – 
even more so when the ousted ruling forces 
enjoy a qualified majority in the legislature. 
Pressure exerted both from below by the 
mobilizations – which have been called 
the Revolution of the Pititas – and from 
above by the police and the military put an 
end to the Morales era. The MAS managed 
to win this year’s elections without the man 
who until then had been considered the 
guarantor of access to power. What hap-
pened over the past year has weakened 
Morales’s leadership; however, he will 
remain an important political actor. 
The transitional government provided 
the opposition forces with a stage on which 
they could have proved that their claims to 
be more inclusive, democratic and repub-
lican than the MAS were justified. But they 
failed to do so. The institutions of law and 
order demonstrated a considerable propen-
sity to be swayed by the winds of politics. 
The politicization of the judiciary and the 
judicialization of politics create a situation 
in which the departure from power means 
loss of immunity and thus exposure to legal 
persecution and prosecution. Furthermore, 
corruption increases the vulnerability 
of actors and institutions; it affects their 
behaviour twice – when they are bought 
and when they are later extorted by the 
threat of denunciation. 
All in all, it can be considered a success 
of Bolivian democracy that the transitional 
government made possible an electoral way 
out. Thus, it was no small achievement that 
a year-long political crisis – one character-
ized by a high degree of polarization along 
ethnic, social and regional lines as well as 
by outbreaks of violence – could be insti-
tutionally channelled through free and fair 
elections amid the Covid-19 pandemic. 
Dr Claudia Zilla is Senior Fellow in The Americas Division at SWP. 
Madeleyne Aguilar Andrade is Fellow in the CrossCulture Programme of ifa (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen). 
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